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Accountable to Whom?
Accountable for What?
Understanding anti-child trafficking
discourse and policy in southern Benin
Neil Howard
Abstract
In Benin, anti-child trafficking discourse misrepresents the nature of
youth labour migration, while anti-child trafficking policy fails to protect
those “beneficiaries” in whose name it is officially designed. Despite
this, both have remained stable for over a decade. This paper attempts
to explain why. It argues that, in contrast to claims made by many
other critiques of anti-trafficking work that policy makers are either
ignorant or malevolent, here discourse and policy are hampered more
by the conceptual, institutional and political structures within which
they are developed and articulated by individuals, thereby ensuring
discursive and policy stability despite inaccuracy and failure.
Keywords: child labour migration, child trafficking discourse, anti-
trafficking policy, Benin
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Neil: You’ve got a lot of experience in this field, haven’t you?
Carl: Yeah, nine years, and all it’s taught me is
how to navigate a bureaucracy.1
Introduction
The story behind this paper begins in 2005. Fresh-faced and na ve, I
travelled to Benin to start working with a child rights NGO on the topic
of child trafficking. Well-versed in the standard horror stories, I quickly
learnt, through meeting young labour migrants, “victims of
trafficking”, and their communities, that all was not quite as it seemed.
As with elsewhere in the world,2 a disjunct existed between the way
institutions represented and responded to “trafficking” and the
“trafficked”, and the way the trafficked understood and represented
themselves. My research has been designed to explore this disjunct,
and has sought to ask what sustains it. Where answers often point to
Machiavellian politicians uninterested in the lives of the poor, in what
follows, I will offer a different analysis. I will argue that inertia, stability
and resistance to change within anti-trafficking discourse and policy
result from the discursive, institutional and political constraints within
which they are elaborated. The paper begins with a background to the
emergence of child trafficking as an issue for concern in Benin and
explains the research I have conducted into it. It briefly identifies the
gap between narrative and reality and that between current and optimal
1 All names of individuals, institutions and villages have been either changed or
anonymised to protect the identity of informants. Details can be provided on
request. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations from French are my own.
2 See, for example, L Agustin, ‘Migrants in the Mistress’s House: Other voices in
the “trafficking” debate’ Social Politics, vol. 12, no. 1, 2005, pp. 96—117; E
Alber, ‘Child Trafficking in West Africa’ in A M Gonzalez, et al. (eds), Frontiers
of Globalization: Kinship and family structure in Africa, Africa World Press,
London, 2011, pp. 71—93; R Andrijasevic, ‘The Cross-Border Migration’ in R
Andrijasevic (ed.), Migration, Agency and Citizenship in Sex Trafficking,
Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, UK, 2010; T Bastia, ‘Child Trafficking or
Teenage Migration? Bolivian migrants in Argentina’ International Migration,
vol. 43, no. 4, 2005; S Castle, and A Diarra, The International Migration of
Young Malians: Tradition, necessity or rite of passage? School of Hygiene and
Tropical Medicine, London, 2003; A de Lange, ‘Child Labour Migration and
Trafficking in Rural Burkina Faso’ International Migration vol. 45, no. 2, 2007,
147—167; M Dottridge, ‘Introduction’ in M Dottridge (ed.) Collateral Damage:
The impact of anti-trafficking measures on human rights around the world,
GAATW, Bangkok, 2007.
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policy. Subsequently, it grounds its analysis in the work of discourse
theorists such as Norman Fairclough and Michel Foucault and
development ethnographers such as David Mosse.
Setting the Scene
Human trafficking exploded as an issue in Benin with the Etireno affair
in 2001. The Etireno was a Nigerian trawler used by people-smugglers
to illegally transport Beninese and other West African children3 to
Gabon. After a complex series of events involving law enforcement
and diplomatic personnel from various countries, the ship and its
passengers were left stranded at sea, prompting local child protection
organisations to raise the alarm and the world’s media to descend on
the region in order to report on ‘the slave ship’ that heralded the
uncovering of ‘a modern-day slave trade’.4 Benin was quickly identified
as an epicentre of the traffic in children, and the government
responded by ratifying the UN Trafficking Protocol,5 opening its doors
to an influx of anti-trafficking money, and jointly establishing various
anti-child trafficking initiatives.
The definition of child trafficking in operation in the country broadly
classes the crime as any part of the process of ‘(coerced) movement
for the purpose of exploitation’. As per Article 3(c) of the Trafficking
Protocol, a minor’s consent to engaging in activities defined as
‘exploitative’ is deemed juridically irrelevant, such that these activities
(and anything facilitating them) are thus always seen to constitute
trafficking. Within both the Trafficking Protocol and Benin’s national
3 Though I consider “children” and “childhood” to be situational concepts varying
according to time, place, culture and social structure, amongst other things,
the institutional literature and policy I am examining take “children” to be
those under the biological age of 18 and “childhood” thus to be the period
before one reaches that age. Since I am reflecting on the appropriateness of
these institutional understandings and policies, I have decided to engage with
them on their own terms, and have therefore used the same criteria throughout
this study. In my study, however, I focused almost entirely on adolescent
migrants, and the word “child” will be used interchangeably with “youth”
unless otherwise specified.
4 The Independent, 18 April 2001, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/
africa/mystery-of-missing-children-as-slave-ship-docks-681766.html.
5 United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention
Against Transnational Organised Crime, UN General Assembly, New York, 2000.
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legislation, exploitation comprises a non-exclusive list of situations,
including forced labour, slavery or servitude, but also, in Benin, work
which ‘by its nature and/or the conditions in which it is exercised,
may damage the health, safety or morals of the child’.6 This draws on
the International Labour Organisation (ILO)’s related anti-child labour
framework, according to which those activities deemed inherently
exploitative include work in:
mining and quarrying; manufacturing; construction; electricity,
gas and water; sanitary services; transport, storage and
communication; and plantations and other agricultural
undertakings mainly producing for commercial purposes, but
excluding family and small-scale holdings producing for local
consumption and not regularly employing hired workers.7
In practice, this has led to the de facto criminalisation of most of the
remunerated activity in which young people engage in Benin. My
research into the appropriateness of this criminalisation and into the
operation of anti-trafficking policy more broadly in Benin consisted of
14 months of multi-sited fieldwork, during which I interviewed more
than 300 people and observed and worked with individuals and
institutions at every level of the anti-trafficking policy chain. I focused
at the institutional level on those bodies that are at the heart of
producing and sustaining the anti-trafficking discourse in Benin, and
at the forefront of forming and implementing anti-trafficking policy,
both in Cotonou, Benin’s de facto capital, and throughout the country
more widely. These bodies include: UNICEF and the ILO, from among
the international organisations working in this field; the US
Departments of Labour and of International Development, the Danish
Development Agency, the EU and France, from the donor community;
the Family and Justice Ministries, from within the Beninese
government; and a collection of national and international child-focused
NGOs operating in Benin.
At the community level, I concentrated my research entirely in the
south of the country, principally because, in Benin, the “hub” of child
labour, trafficking and exploitation has been widely identified as the
6 LOI N 2006-04 du 05 avril 2006 Portant r pression des auteurs de traite et
conditions de d placement des mineurs en R publique du B nin, Cotonou:
Pr sidence de la R publique.
7 Article 3 of International Labour Office, Convention Concerning Minimum
Age for Admission to Employment, ILO, Geneva, 1973.
DOI: 10.14197/atr.201213
ANTI-TRAFFICKING REVIEW Issue 1, June 2012 47
poor, agricultural Zou Department, from which teenage boys frequently
leave to work in the gravel pits of Abeokuta in Western Nigeria and
girls leave for domestic work in the major coastal cities. Within this
department, two communes—Zakpota and Zogbodomey—have been
identified as particularly affected by the above-mentioned phenomena.
I thus selected four case-study villages, two from each commune, two
with flagship “village child protection committees” and two without.
In these villages, I used various participatory techniques, including
principally open-ended individual and group interviews, the focus of
which was on how people see their life-worlds, how they experience
and view (hazardous) youth work and movement, and what they have
to say about current anti-trafficking interventions. In total, I
interviewed 109 adults and 61 adolescents from these villages.
Additionally, I interviewed 15 adults and 28 adolescents from various
other locations in southern Benin, during my Masters fieldwork in 2007.
The current and former youth migrants I interviewed were
predominantly male, since I was principally examining adolescent male
labour migration to the gravel pits and surrounding areas in Nigeria; I
did however interview a number of female former domestic servants
in institutional care.
The data have been carefully coded and continually analysed with relevant
actors over the course of the research’s unfolding and in subsequent
return trips. Though my sample does provide a good cross-section of
deep, qualitative data, it is not statistically representative and should
not be read as such.
Narratives, Policies and their Discontents
The dominant institutional narrative around trafficking in Benin holds
that trafficking is a major problem in the country and involves
unsuspecting children being forced away from home and into
exploitative work, largely as a result of pathological cause-factors,
ranging from grinding poverty to the corruption of traditional practices
and parental irresponsibility.8 This narrative is illustrated in the extract
below, from an emblematic briefing paper written for the US Secretary
of Labor, on the event of his visit to Benin as part of the US “war on
trafficking”:
8 See: N P Howard, Independent Child Migration in Southern Benin: An
ethnographic challenge to the “pathological” paradigm, VDM Verlag & Co.,
Saarbrucken, 2008; E Alber, ‘Child Trafficking in West Africa’ in A M Gonzalez,
et al. (eds), Frontiers of Globalization: Kinship and family structure in Africa,
Africa World Press, London, 2011, pp. 71—93.
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Child trafficking is a multifaceted phenomenon in West Africa.
It started with parents placing their children with relatives.
That placement is called in Fon, one of southern Benin
languages [sic], “vidomegon”. The culture of vidomegon,
originally allowed more fortunate members of the community
to receive the children of less fortunate members, in a climate
of solidarity. The idea is that by confiding a less fortunate
child in the home of someone who is better endowed
economically, that child will be better taken care of. This
practice is rampant all over West Africa. However, over time
the practice has been abused by individuals who have sought
financial rewards, resulting in a behavior where children are
given to traffickers, who in turn sell them to agents in
neighboring countries. Victims of this new practice are reduced
to mere commodities that are bought, sold, transported, and
resold according to market forces of supply and demand. Most
trafficked children are threatened with physical and emotional
abuse, and nearly all suffer from neglect or diseases. Poverty
is one of the causes of child labor and trafficking in Benin.9
Against such a discursive backdrop, it should come as no surprise that
anti-child trafficking policy is highly interventionist in Benin, with
emphasis placed on the prevention of exploitative work by the pre-
emptive thwarting of the migration seen to lead to it.10 Measures
include the strengthening of border patrols, enhanced cooperation with
Nigeria on trans-border surveillance, widespread anti-work and anti-
movement “sensitisation” or “responsibilisation” campaigns, the
promulgation of the Law Regulating the Movement of Minors and
Suppressing the Traffic in Children, and the establishment of village
vigilance committees expected to prevent youth labour migration at
the village level.11 Poverty is also addressed, though only through
individualised schemes involving the promotion of apprenticeships.12
Though tens of millions of dollars have been invested in these
initiatives, my qualitative research with young labour migrants and
their communities strongly suggests that they fail. Young people still
9 Briefing Paper for USDOL Secretary Chao: ‘Mission’s Intervention in the Fight
Against Child Trafficking in Benin’, 17 November 2003.
10 MFE and ILO, Plan d’Action National De Lutte Contre La Traite Des Enfants A
Des Fins d’Exploitation De Leur Travail, MFE and ILO, Cotonou, 2008.
11 Supra note 8.
12 N P Howard, ‘Promoting “Healthy Childhoods” and Keeping Children “At Home”:
Beninese anti-trafficking policy in times of neoliberalism’ International
Migration, forthcoming.
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migrate and they still work. Indeed, these extracts from my notes are
indicative of the answers I received when I asked them whether people
pay heed to anti-trafficking efforts:
Have some of you ever been away to do holiday work? Yes,
every single one of us! That is what allows us to continue at
school! You can go to Nigeria or Sav  and earn 30,000 or 40,000
FCFA in a summer. What work do you do? In Sav , it is the
land. In Nigeria, it is the land but also the quarries. How is it?
It’s hard but it’s ok. Do NGOs, white people or the government
come here and say that it’s bad? Yes, loads. Why? Because
they see that it can be hard, but they offer us no alternative.
What do you say to them? When they come and speak to us,
their words go in one ear and come out the other. We listen
and then we ignore them.13
How do you go about getting around the authorities? They
said the state has set up village committees all over the place,
but these are corrupt. We can easily turn them and take kids
away, no problem. There are also many paths that you can
take towards and across the border and the state has no idea
about them all. The police sit there and guard the ones they
know about and so we just take the others. The state is really
stupid. Sometimes we even take kids down to Cotonou and
then, under the nose of Yayi Boni [Benin’s President], we take
them on a boat to Nigeria or Gabon.14
My research into community understandings of youth work and
migration offers an indication of why this might be the case. In contrast
to the institutional discourse which paints most work and migration as
exploitation and trafficking, young labour migrants and their
communities see their work and migration as both necessary and highly
constructive. Central to this understanding is the well-founded belief
that economic opportunity is concentrated away from the resource-
and capital-poor village and that labour migration thus represents the
only viable path to a better future, since it allows them to access
money and bring it home. In the words of one adolescent former migrant
labourer:
13 Boys in Interview with Group 14, Sehere Village, 14/5/2010.
14 Man in interview with Group 2, General Zou, 12/4/2010.
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We don’t have the same view [as the authorities]. We think
that leaving can be good, especially as it is a way to find money,
or to come back and put a roof on your father’s house.15
In the absence of policies which directly target the very clear,
structurally-influenced material underpinnings of youth labour migration
in Benin,16 these views are unlikely to alter.
And Yet Things Remain Unchanged…?
Despite the inaccuracies within the trafficking narrative and the
failures of trafficking policy, little has changed over the past ten years.
The major questions posed by my research, therefore, are: how is it
that discourse and policy can get it so wrong? and why have they not
developed? Research from similar contexts identifies policy-maker
ignorance or politicised malevolence as an explanation, suggesting
that relevant actors either fail to understand ground-level realities or
remain uninterested in addressing them.17 I believe this to be reductive.
Indeed, it attributes too much agency to those in power and fails to
take sufficient account of the power of the structures within which
they operate. In this section, then, I seek to offer a more nuanced
explanation for discursive and policy stability. I will do so by deploying
discourse theory and by focusing on the importance of “orders of
discourse” (and of powerful actors in structuring those orders) in
framing and constraining both policy-maker understandings and policy
choices.
15 Interview, Non School-Going Group, Tenga Village, 16/4/2010.
16 This will be further discussed below. See also N P Howard,  ‘Protecting Children
from Trafficking in Benin: The need for politics and participation’ Special Issue
of Development in Practice, forthcoming.
17 See, for example, C Ausserer, ‘Control in the Name of Protection: A critical
analysis of the discourse of international human trafficking as a form of forced
migration’ in N P Howard and M Lalani (eds), ‘The Politics of Human Trafficking’
St Antony’s International Review (STAIR), vol. 4, no. 1, 2008; J Davies, ‘How to
Use a Trafficked Woman: The alliance between political and criminal trafficking
organisations’ Recherches Sociologiques et Anthropologiques, vol. 1, 2008,
pp. 114—131.
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Orders of discourse
According to Van Dijk, discourse is ‘an essentially fuzzy concept’ while,
for authors such as Gee, it can include, at its most basic, any instance
or form of communicative action.18 In more complex usages, the term
also refers to systems of meaning and histories of multi-semiotic
interaction. In this paper, I will be following theorists such as Fairclough
and Foucault in understanding discourse as short-hand for ‘relatively
stabilized configurations of discourse practices’,19 or ‘orders of
discourse’,20 by which is meant ‘systems of thought composed of ideas,
attitudes, courses of action, beliefs and practices that systematically
construct the subjects and the worlds of which they speak’,21 as well
as being constructed by them. As Candlin explains, this denotes ‘a
means of talking and writing about and acting upon worlds…which
both constructs and is constructed by a set of social practices within
these worlds, and in so doing both reproduces and reconstructs afresh
particular social-discursive practices, constrained or encouraged by
more macro movements in the overarching social formation’.22 In other
words, discourse, as it is understood here, is a set of relatively stable,
linguistically expressed social understandings of phenomena, continually
(re)constituting and being (re)constituted by the practices of
individuals within time and space. In this section, I will reflect on two
of the core social understandings I believe to lie at the root of anti-
trafficking narratives and anti-trafficking policy in Benin. These
understandings are (western notions of) childhood and neoliberalism.
18 T A Van Dijk (ed.), Discourse as Structure and Process, SAGE, London, 1996, p.
1; J P Gee, An Introduction to Discourse Analysis: Theory and method, 2nd
Edition, Routledge, New York, 2005.
19 N Fairclough, Critical Discourse Analysis: The critical study of language,
Longman, New York, 1995, p. 2.
20 M Foucault, The Order of Things: An archaeology of the human sciences,
Routledge, London, 1969; Discipline and Punish: The birth of the prison,
Gallimard, Paris, 1977; (1980a), ‘Prison Talk’ in C Gordon (ed.), Power/
Knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972—1977, Pantheon,
New York, 1980a; ‘The History of Sexuality’ in C Gordon (ed.), Power/
Knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972—1977, Pantheon,
New York, 1980b; ‘Truth and Power’ in C Gordon (ed.), Power/Knowledge:
Selected interviews and other writings 1972—1977, Pantheon, New York,
1980c; ‘Two Lectures’ in C Gordon (ed.), Power/Knowledge: Selected
interviews and other writings 1972—1977, Pantheon, New York, 1980d.
21 I Lessa, ‘Discursive Struggles Within Social Welfare: Restaging teen
motherhood’ British Journal of Social Work, vol. 36, no. 2, 2006, pp. 283—298,
p. 285.
22 In A Jaworski and N Coupland, The Discourse Reader, 2nd Edition, Routledge,
London, 2006, p. 2.
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Childhood
Within the anti-trafficking community working in and on Benin, a very
particular notion of what childhood is and should be persists. In contrast
to localised understandings of childhood and child development, the
policy establishment here betrays a very rigid, westernised conception
of childhood that centres on the belief that children are inherently
vulnerable, that they are in need of protection from work, and that
their development can only be guaranteed at home and at school.
Gidi, for instance, is a senior Beninese government official. In one
interview we conducted, she explained that as a result of her country’s
anti-trafficking work, ‘people are finally understanding what it means
to be a child’.23 In her view, this meant a vulnerable school-goer who
should be protected from work. Similarly, Veronica, a local-level Beninese
official, argued that all people under 18 are children, they are still
developing and therefore they must be prevented from migrating for
work even if they want to.24 Why, one may ask. Because, in the words
of Cyril, Veronica’s colleague: ‘When we send children away, they end
up missing out, so it’s better if a child stays here. That way he has
more chance of developing correctly, of becoming a man tomorrow.’25
As has been argued extensively elsewhere,26 though these
understandings reflect norms which emerged in, and are particular to,
the socio-historical and economic context of the industrialising/
industrialised West, they have become globalised through their
centrality to the operations of international child protection
institutions.27 As such, they frame the (understandings of the)
individuals and bodies working across the anti-child trafficking field.
And, as Dorte Thorsen has argued in her work on anti-child trafficking
discourse and policy in Burkina Faso, they are ‘instrumental at policy-
level in condemning adolescents’ migration and attracting funding for
23 Interview with Gidi, 11/3/2010.
24 Interview with Veronica, 7/4/2010.
25 Interview with Cyril, 7/4/2010.
26 M Bourdillon, et al., Rights and Wrongs of Children’s Work, Rutgers University
Press, New Jersey, 2011.
27 See: J Boyden, ‘Childhood and the Policy Makers: A comparative perspective
on the globalisation of childhood’ in A James and A Prout (eds), Constructing
and Reconstructing Childhood: Contemporary issues in the sociological study
of childhood, Falmer Press, London, 1997, pp. 190—216; D Thorsen, ‘“If Only
I Get Enough Money for a Bicycle!” A study of child migration against a backdrop
of exploitation and trafficking in Burkina Faso’ Occasional Paper, Centre for
African Studies, University of Copenhagen, 2007.
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projects aimed to “protect” and repatriate rural children and youth on
the move’.28 This has, of course, also been the case in Benin, where
anti-trafficking strategy relies on attempts to keep under-18s at home
and in school, and to criminalise work that is viewed through the lens
of international norms as de facto exploitative and de facto bad for
children.
Neoliberalism
The second major framing discourse in operation within Benin’s anti-
trafficking world is that of neoliberalism. Whilst debate abounds as to
what exactly neoliberalism constitutes, there is general agreement
that it represents ‘a political philosophy of governance…premised on
a mantra of market rationality and on the active encouragement of
laissez-faire economic systems’.29 It involves a reduction of the state’s
role as service-provider and labour protector,30 privatisation of state
resources, the acceptance of pre-existing distributions of wealth and
power, and the placing of responsibility for economic well-being firmly
on the shoulders of the individual economic agent—in Foucault’s terms,
the homo economicus, whose duty it is to maximise himself as a vehicle
of capital and self-advancement.31
That such a philosophy underpins the work of the Beninese state and
its partners in their fight against child trafficking is best illustrated by
an examination of the way in which poverty—apparently the prime
cause of trafficking—is understood and responded to in the country.
Almost always, poverty is constructed as a pre-existing, a-political
fact that is just out there. In the National Anti-Trafficking Plan of
Action, there is no discussion whatsoever of why people are so poor
that they apparently allow their children to be exploited, or which
28 D Thorsen, ibid. p.7.
29 K Mitchell, ‘Neoliberal Governmentality in the European Union: Education,
training, and technologies of citizenship’ Environment and Planning D: Society
and Space, vol. 24, 2004, pp. 389—407, p. 389.
30 See, for instance, V Sewpaul and D Holscher, Social Work in Times of Neo-
Liberalism: A post-modern discourse, Van Schaik, Pretoria, 2004.
31 G Burchell, et al., The Foucault Effect: Studies in governmentality, University
of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1991, pp. 36—40.
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relations of power underpin their poverty.32 Similarly, in my interviews
with policy makers, only one of over a 100 institutional employees
independently elaborated on Benin’s poverty beyond simply
acknowledging that it was a reality. Indeed, when I suggested that we
take time to reflect on where that poverty comes from, reactions
ranged from blank stares to periods of silence.
This is further reflected in the way in which anti-trafficking policy
seeks to address poverty. Not only does it avoid directly targeting the
structural underpinnings of youth work, movement and the poverty
which frames it, but when it does “tackle poverty”, it does so through
the individualised promotion of apprenticeships, school bursaries or
family-based income generating activities. Poverty is thus conceived
here as an issue of personal responsibilisation, with individuals moulded
to become the self-sufficient, independent and market-oriented
economic actors embodied by the homo economicus who adapts himself
to pre-existing economic conditions.33
Bringing power back in — vertical constraints
In his seminal discussion of Critical Discourse Analysis, Norman
Fairclough follows Foucault in arguing that although structures and
agents do interact in forming orders of discourse, we should not be
blind to the fact that some agents have more power than others in
setting and maintaining the stability of these orders. He writes:
The power to control discourse is…the power to sustain
particular discursive practices with ideological investments in
dominance over other alternative (including oppositional)
practices.…Power is conceptualized both in terms of
asymmetries between participants in discourse events, and in
terms of unequal capacity to control how texts are produced,
distributed and consumed (and hence the shape of texts) in
particular sociocultural contexts.34
32 Minst re de la Famille et de l’Enfant (MFE) and ILO, Plan D’action National De
Lutte Contre La Traite Des Enfants A Des Fins D’exploitation De Leur Travail,
MFE and ILO, Cotonou, 2008.
33 N P Howard, ‘Promoting “Healthy Childhoods” and Keeping Children “At Home”:
Beninese anti-trafficking policy in times of neoliberalism’ International
Migration, forthcoming.
34 N Fairclough, op. cit., pp. 1—2.
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Critical discourse analysis is thus a method for studying the ‘connections
between language, power and ideology’, a means of deconstructing
both ‘how power relations constrain and control productivity and
creativity in discourse practice, and how a particular relatively stabilized
configuration of discourse practices (“order of discourse”) constitutes
one domain of hegemony’.35 In the case of Beninese anti-trafficking
policy, my research reveals very real exercises of power in both
constructing and maintaining neoliberalism and western childhood as
the base-level operative orders of discourse.
In the case of neoliberalism, this is again best illustrated by examining
the way in which poverty is understood. In Benin, cotton is the major
cash crop. It accounts for around 5 per cent of the GDP and almost 40
per cent of the country’s export receipts.36 Unlike in many other
contexts, it is principally a household industry and provides income
for thousands of families, including in the area where I conducted my
ground-level research. When prices are high, people benefit, with more
farming children in school, less migration for work and small-scale
household projects being realised. Apart from the spike recorded over
the past few months, cotton prices have been at record lows for over
a decade, in large part due to illegal US subsidies, recognised as culpable
by the WTO in a case brought by Brazil to its Appellate Body.37 Many
policy makers know this. Yet, when asked why they do not therefore
advocate a removal of subsidies as part of the fight against the poverty
that underpins trafficking, they admit that doing so is either beyond
their organisational capacity or politically impossible. Rose, for
example, is a senior UN figure working in Cotonou. She explained that
her institution could do nothing about such structural issues because
it was ‘politically unacceptable’.38 Matt, a key US government figure,
said that while he would like to raise the issue, he was doubtful of
success because there were ‘big interests to fight’.39 Sandra, a senior
donor government employee based in Benin, offered a similar
assessment, after which I made the following notes:
35 Ibid.
36 OECD Sahel and West Africa Club Secretariat, Economic and Social Importance
of Cotton Production and Trade in West Africa:  Role of cotton in regional
development, trade and livelihoods, OECD, Paris, 2005, p. 20.
37 D A Sumner, ‘U.S. Farm Programs and African Cotton’ IPC Issue Brief 22,
International Food & Agricultural Trade Policy Council, Washington, DC, 2007.
38 Interview with Rose, 29/9/2009.
39 Interview with Matt, 16/9/2009.
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I asked about the structural focus she mentioned earlier.
What does this entail? Are the subsidies mentioned? Yes,
she said, the effects of this are taken into account, but only
at the ground level. They can’t talk about the top level. Their
last reference is the national level, the government. I
mentioned the hypocrisy of what westerners do and she said
yes, some of the foreigners here in Benin know that their
policies cause poverty and trafficking. Many of them even want
to change it, but they can’t.40
In this policy world, then, discussion of the forces that create poverty
is off-limits. As per the neoliberal order of discourse, pre-existing
distributions of wealth and the relations of power that underpin them
are taken not only as given but beyond questioning, with powerful
actors ensuring that this remains the case.
The same is also true with the discursive order of western childhood.
Though, as explained above, Benin’s anti-trafficking legal framework
demands the blanket abolition of work defined as exploitative, some
policy makers are aware that this is impractical and accept that what
constitutes exploitation will vary from place to place. Some therefore
advocate the adoption of a regulatory as opposed to an abolitionist
framework, based on the recognition that work can be positive for
many children and that abolition often fails.41 Despite this, however,
when I asked senior  figures from the anti-child labour bodies fighting
trafficking in Benin why they did not pursue a regulatory instead of an
abolitionist line, I was told flatly that this was impossible because it
did not fit with institutional discursive norms. What if children have
no alternative but to migrate for work? I asked Handel, who had global
responsibility for his organisation’s anti-trafficking programme. ‘It
doesn’t matter,’ he responded, ‘we cannot finance anything that
disagrees with our normative framework. We have to be consistent
with our positions even if children are working. If not, in twenty years,
where will we be?’42
40 Interview with Sandra, 17/2/2010.
41 M Bourdillon, et al., ‘Re-assessing Minimum-age Standards for Children’s Work’
International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, vol. 29, no. 3/4, 2009, pp.
106—117.
42 Interview with Handel, 21/5/2009.
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The need for representational harmony
Handel’s rigidity points to a further issue of major importance. In this
policy world, great emphasis is placed on the importance of
representational harmony, such that policy and its justifying narratives
are depicted as accurate, appropriate and coherent even where they
are not. Thus Handel admitted to editing reports so that they fit with
institutional discourse and organisational responses to poverty,
portrayed as optimal even where they palpably are not. Why is this so?
Within the anthropological study of policy making and the ethnographic
examination of international aid chains, authors such as David Mosse
have argued that, in a top-down neoliberal policy world where
“efficiency” is the major criterion for the spending of public money, it
is crucial for actors to be able to represent what they do as a well-
planned and well-executed success. This leads to a reluctance on the
part of institutions to publicly question their pre-existing narratives,
and results in staff-members moulding their representations of reality
to have them conform to those narratives. It further results in bodies
lower down the disbursement chain having to contort their
representations in order to have them fit the terms defined by those
above, while those above enforce representational stability so as not
to lose the symbolic capital that they are able to translate into
government funding.43
In the case of trafficking in Benin, this can be illustrated with two
examples. The first is the Etireno affair, which sparked the explosion
of interest in trafficking in the first place. Abidi, a UN employee working
in Cotonou at the time, explained that ‘when the Etireno happened, it
was a huge thing for us and was amazing in terms of the mobilisation
of resources’.44 Ayala, the former Beninese government minister
responsible for children at the time of the crisis, concurred: ‘Some
bodies used this for their own ends, to attract funding and attention.’45
As Alexia, an international NGO operative working in Benin, explained:
‘In child protection, you have to be fashionable to attract funding.’
43 D Mosse, ‘Is Good Policy Unimplementable? Reflections on the ethnography of
aid policy and practice’ Development and Change, vol.  35, no. 4, 2004, pp.
639—671, p. 651.
44 Interview with Abidi, 12/1/2010.
45 Interview with Ayala, Cotonou, 13/3/2010.
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Fundamentally, this means eschewing the political economy of poverty
or the reality that sometimes children must take sub-optimal jobs for
want of better alternatives, and instead promoting the narrative of
innocent and enslaved children in need of rescue through individualised
policy responses.
The second example concerns government behaviour. Jeremia, another
UN employee with an intricate knowledge of the various political figures
working in Benin, explained that the heavily anti-movement anti-
trafficking law adopted by Benin’s government was, in large part, the
result of major pressure from a US embassy determined to see laws on
the books as a sign of success in its push on the anti-terror and security
agenda. Though many civil society representatives privately opposed
the draconian nature of the law, arguing that it was un-enforceable
given the mobility of the populace, US representatives were unmoved,
and the Beninese government accepted that it needed to pass the law
in order to ensure that the US would continue offering its bilateral
assistance.46 Beyond money, the Beninese government also derived
symbolic, representational capital from the move. As Benin’s senior
civil servant working on trafficking explained:
The law allowed us to move from Tier 3 to Tier 2 in the US’s
ranking of countries [in terms of the quality of their anti-
trafficking response] and it gave us a good image in Geneva,
with the Commission on the Rights of the Child, and also with
the donors.47
By thus playing the game according to the rules of the discursive order
established by those who sit above them in the hierarchical power and
disbursement chain, actors lower down the pecking order are able to
create and accumulate the symbolic capital which is subsequently cashed
for the material capital that ensures their very institutional survival.
46 Interview with Jeremia, 2/9/2007.
47 Interview with Dibi, 10/3/2010.
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Conclusion
When reflecting on accountability within anti-trafficking policy making
as it operates in Benin, it is clear that those above do not answer to
those below. Indeed, accountability does not operate optimally from
policy maker to policy beneficiary. Rather, policy and its justifying
narratives are accountable more to the institutional and political logics,
imperatives and orders of discourse within which policy makers exist.
This is not to suggest that Machiavellian explanations are sufficient;
far from it. Policy makers frequently recognise the drawbacks of what
they do—they are merely constrained by the system and those who pull
its most influential levers from offering any meaningful alternative.
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